Since I am in general agreement with Johnson-Laird & Byrne (JL&B)'s approach and nd their experiments convincing, my commentary will be limited to several suggestions for extension and renement of their theory. Images and Models. The distinction between models and images is treated briey in JL&B (pp. 38, 93, 140), but four dierences are described in Johnson-Laird (1983, esp. ch. 8). I'll argue that the distinction better treated a matter of degree than of kind.
Images and Models. The distinction between models and images is treated briey in JL&B (pp. 38, 93, 140) , but four dierences are described in Johnson-Laird (1983, esp. ch. 8) . I'll argue that the distinction better treated a matter of degree than of kind.
First, Johnson-Laird (1983, pp. 157, 165) denes images as models from a particular viewpoint, but this is inessential to the idea of an image. For example, the transformation of an image from an occulocentric frame to an object-centered frame is just one of many transformations it may undergo in being put into more abstract form. It seems arbitrary to treat dierently images in dierent reference frames, since many of the same processes (e.g., rotation and translation of components) will be applicable to both of them.
Second it's claimed that models dier from images in that models can represent negation and disjunction whereas images cannot (JL&B, pp. 38-39, 196; Johnson-Laird 1983, pp. 423-424) , but it is better to consider these \propositional tags" to be related to intentions toward perceptual and motor images. Here, by`intention' I mean a functional relation to a component of a mental representation (including both images and models). Thus it has both form (`anticipation that',`denial that',`surprise that', etc.) and content (indicating its content); essentially a predicate plus a vector. The point is that intentions toward sensory images are closely related to intentions toward mental models.
For example, orientation toward the absence of an expected object is an intention, the content of which is the absent object. Thus, for perceptual images that are suciently abstract, there is a mechanism for representing the negation of a token within an image. Similarly, the presence of an unexpected object can produce an orienting reaction and generate an intention of the form this shouldn't be here'. Intentions to absent and unexpected objects are closely related to negations of components of mental models, which are intentions of the form`this can't be here'. Other \tags" proposed by JL&B, such as`exhaustive representation' (p. 45) are intentions corresponding to perceptual intentions, such as those of the form`this is typical' or`this must be here'.
Furthermore, just as we may judge an entire scene beautiful, threatening, or absurd, so an entire mental model may be the content of an intention to the eect that the entire model is impossible, incoherent, or unacceptable; this is JL&B's negation of an entire model, but it corresponds to intentions referring to an entire image. Disjunction is not a relation that has to be represented within images, since a disjunction of models is represented by multiple models in working memory (e.g., p. 52), and this works as well for images.
The third distinction between models and images is that the tokens of a mental model may not be accessible to consciousness (JL&B, p. 39), whereas, presumably, the tokens of an image are accessible. These \invisible tokens" may simply correspond to unattended elements in a perceptual image; that is, they are represented in the background, but are not the object of an intention. For components of both images and models, presence in conscious awareness is a matter of degree, with some elements being more salient because they are the objects of intentions. Although JL&B (p. 39) say, \What matters is, not the phenomenal experience, but the structure of the models," consideration of the phenomenal experience may benet a more general understanding of mental representation.
Finally, JL&B cite as evidence in favor of models over images that there was no signicant dierence in performance of subjects on relational reasoning problems that diered in imageability (p. 140), but this is not supported by the experiments described, since all the relations they cite are conducive to visual reasoning. The relations`in the same place as' and`equal in height to' have obvious visual representations, and`related to in the simple consanguineal sense' is simply visualized as`in the same place as'. In fact, experiments to refute imageability are hard to design, since 3D space is so powerful a medium for relational reasoning. On the other hand, positive evidence for imageability comes from the results presented on p. 97: there was no signicant dierence in the performance on two-dimensional and one-dimensional problems. This suggests that we use our two-dimensional visual reasoning ability for both one-and two-dimensional situations, further evidence that models are abstract images.
In conclusion, the dierence between images and models is not one of kind, but a matter of degree of abstractness: models correspond to images at very abstract stages in the sensorimotor circuit, where we nd abstract reference frames, intentions of various kinds and a continuum of degrees of presence to conscious. Treating models and images as two species of the same kind may illuminate both and, in addition, expose the nature and role of intentions in cognition.
